Data room / Run 1, stages 3 to 5: scenarios, model, verdict

Model assumptions

Model, 1,045 words, about 5 min to read

run-1/models/ASSUMPTIONS.md Open the file as written

Stage 4 Quant Model — ASSUMPTIONS

Every assumption the model (equity_flow_model.py) makes. Per RUNBOOK.md, the model is held to these; anything the code needs that is not stated here must be added here, not silently embedded. Results in RESULTS.md.

Deal parameters (from the spec, §§3–7, 11, 19, 29, 33, 36)

  1. Enrollment value V0 = $625,000 (spec §19 standard deal). Enrollment value equals the appraised value; the appreciation baseline is enrollment value, not purchase price (spec §3, §33).
  2. Monthly disbursement = $1,500; contracted term = 84 months (7 years); committed total = $126,000.
  3. Origination fee = 2.5% of committed total = $3,150, netted from the first disbursements; the capital-return basis remains the GROSS amount (spec §29 Flow 1). Homeowner's net cash received over a full term = $122,850.
  4. Appreciation share = 25% during the active term; +1 percentage point per completed ride-along year (years 8, 9, …), hard cap 50% (spec §7). Share at exit year T (T ≥ 7): min(25 + (T − 7), 50)%.
  5. Capital return = 1.0x of gross disbursed (no premium), Priority ahead of the appreciation share (spec §11, §29).
  6. Documented-improvement offsets (spec §15) are ignored (assumed zero).

Financing and market environment

  1. First mortgage: $350,000, 30-year fixed at 3.5%, current at enrollment; standard amortization. (Spec §19 implies ≈$350K payoff at year 7; we amortize explicitly — balance at month 84 ≈ $297,656.)
  2. Home-price appreciation (HPA) is deterministic and constant per scenario: grid −3% to +8%/yr in 1-point steps. No volatility, no path dependence beyond the pause rule below.
  3. Selling costs at exit = 7% of sale price (commission + transfer taxes + closing costs), paid from proceeds AHEAD of the Equity Flow claim — adopting the title reviewer's finding (title 2.2) that the spec's §29 Priority 5 ordering is unenforceable against third parties; real closings pay costs of sale first.
  4. Exit = voluntary arm's-length sale at fair value in exit year T; grid T ∈ {1,2,3,5,7,10,12,15,20,25,30}. No death/foreclosure/bankruptcy legal outcomes are modeled (those are Stage 3 scenario findings; this model prices the contract as written and enforced).

Market pause (the spec's contested mechanic)

  1. Two branches are modeled (the spec is internally inconsistent — investor A10; SCENARIOS.md preamble):
    • Branch P (pause operates): value is checked quarterly; disbursement occurs in a month only if the value at the most recent quarterly check was ≥ enrollment value. Under deterministic negative HPA the first check (month 3) already prints below V0, so deployment stops at month 3 (~$4,500 gross). At HPA = 0 the value never falls BELOW enrollment, so payments continue (tie goes to payment).
    • Branch N (pause inoperative, spec §20 behavior): full disbursement through min(T, 84 months) regardless of value path. Headline tables use Branch P for HPA < 0 and note Branch N variants; positive-HPA cells are identical across branches (value never drops below enrollment on a deterministic up-path).
  2. Paused months do not extend the term and do not reduce the share (spec §29 Flow 3a).

Settlement (waterfall as practiced)

  1. Escrow available to the Equity Flow claim at exit = max(0, sale price − 7% costs − mortgage balance at exit).
  2. Investor claim = gross disbursed + share × max(0, sale price − V0). Settlement paid = min(claim, escrow available). Non-recourse: no deficiency (spec §14, §29).
  3. Homeowner net at closing = escrow available − settlement paid.

Customer-side metrics

  1. Homeowner cash flows: +$1,500/mo in disbursed months, with the first $3,150 withheld (fee netted against the earliest disbursements); −settlement at exit month. APR-equivalent = annualized monthly IRR of that flow (the effective cost of the cash received). Where the homeowner receives nothing (immediate pause) and pays nothing beyond received, the APR is reported as n/a.
  2. Taxes are EXCLUDED. Per tax H-1, exit taxation likely worsens every appreciating cell for the homeowner (gain computed on 100% of appreciation incl. the investor's slice); the model is therefore homeowner-favorable in appreciating cells.
  3. HELOC benchmark: identical monthly draws (same months as EF disburses, same net-of-fee amounts), balance accruing at 8.5% APR monthly, repaid in full at exit. No fees. "EF worse than HELOC" = EF settlement > HELOC payoff at exit (dollar test) — equivalently APR-equivalent > 8.5%.
  4. Cash-out refi benchmark: the homeowner refinances the $350K balance plus draws $122,850 cash at a 7.0% 30-year rate (destroying the 3.5% lock). Cost = extra interest paid vs. the old loan through exit year T on the refinanced balance, computed as (payment difference × months) − (principal-balance difference at T). This is a crude but directionally honest measure of the rate-lock destruction the product is designed to avoid.
  5. "Doing nothing" benchmark: zero cash, zero cost. EF is "worse than doing nothing" only in net-cost terms (cost > $0 in every cell except pure pause cells); we report EF net cost as the price of liquidity and flag cells where that price exceeds 15% APR-equivalent as economically indefensible vs. simply not transacting.

Investor-side metrics

  1. Investor cash flows: −$1,500/mo in disbursed months, +$3,150 fee at month 0 (treated as fund revenue; note investor A15 — the fee is double-promised to opex in the spec), +settlement at exit. Gross deal-level IRR (annualized monthly IRR) and multiple (settlement + fee) / gross disbursed. NO fund-level fees, carry, servicing costs, credit losses, pause-ops costs, or legal costs are subtracted — the spec defines none (investor O1); results are therefore investor-favorable upper bounds.
  2. Hurdle for "clears cost of capital" = 8% gross IRR (investor Stage 1 benchmark). "Negative" = IRR < 0, which under non-recourse occurs only when the escrow cap binds (settlement < deployed).
  3. Stress rows: fully deployed vintage sold at drawdowns of −10% to −45% from enrollment, reproducing the actuarial-crossexam recovery arithmetic (breakeven drawdown ≈ −27%).

General

  1. All flows nominal; no discounting other than the IRR calculations. Monthly compounding; IRR solved by bisection on monthly rate, annualized as (1+r_m)^12 − 1.
  2. Single-deal model. Portfolio effects (correlation, vintage mix, diversification) are out of scope; Stage 1 actuarial/investor reports cover them.
  3. No behavioral modeling: exit year is exogenous. The lock-in-selected book's actual exit distribution (mean ≈ year 24, actuarial 4.1) should be used to weight the columns when reading the tables.