Data room / Successor concepts and their reviews

Version 3 concept: symmetric index-settled share

Concept, 1,376 words, about 6 min to read

concepts/EQUITY-FLOW-V3-CONCEPT.md Open the file as written

EQUITY FLOW v3 — CONCEPT SHEET v0.1

Symmetric · Index-Settled · Collared · Lump-Funded, Monthly-Experienced

Third-generation concept. v1 (Equity Flow) was killed by the full panel (see ../ANALYSIS.md): the 1.0x floor + monthly cadence + not-a-loan wager failed on settled law. v2 (HomeDraw, HOMEDRAW-CONCEPT.md) survives legally as an honest loan but is "another loan / reverse-mortgage flavor" — sound, not differentiated, and its capital stack is squeezed. v3 attempts the original dream on a defensible foundation: a genuinely two-sided equity trade whose surplus comes from RISK REALLOCATION, not rate.

Thesis in three sentences. Homeowners are catastrophically over-concentrated: one house, one street, most of their net worth, no way to diversify without selling and losing their rate lock. Institutions want owner-occupied housing beta — the largest asset class in America — and cannot buy it in any clean form. v3 lets the homeowner sell a slice of their MARKET exposure (not their home, not their own improvements) for cash today, with the investor genuinely sharing losses as well as gains.


1. Core mechanics

  • The trade: at closing, the investor pays the homeowner a single lump sum (the "Advance," e.g., 10% of home value). In exchange, at settlement the investor receives the Advance adjusted — up or down, symmetrically — by a contracted share of the change in the metro home-price index (FHFA MSA-level HPI or equivalent), applied to the home's enrollment value as notional.
  • Settlement formula: Payoff = Advance + Share × V0 × (HPI_exit / HPI_0 − 1) subject to: cap at 3.0× Advance (homeowner-protective ceiling), floor at $0 (investor can lose the entire Advance; homeowner never writes a check beyond the payoff from proceeds), and non-recourse (payoff further capped at the homeowner's net sale proceeds after senior payoff and costs of sale).
  • Illustrative pricing: $700K home → Advance $70K (10%); Share = 35% of index change on $700K notional. At +3%/yr index over 10 years: payoff ≈ $154K (investor ≈ 8.2%/yr). Index flat: payoff = $70K (homeowner's cost of 10 years of liquidity: $0). Index −20%: payoff ≈ $21K — the investor's check absorbed $49K of the homeowner's crash.
  • Settlement events: voluntary sale, title transfer, death-triggered disposition, or homeowner-elected buyout at any time. Buyout price is the same published formula computed on the current index print — no appraisal, no negotiation, no dispute process. Optional outside settlement date at year 30, also index-settled.
  • Monthly experience: the Advance funds at closing into a homeowner-owned drawdown account (bank/trust titled to the homeowner) that pays out monthly on their chosen schedule. The homeowner owns the undrawn balance from day one — sponsor insolvency cannot touch it. They may equally take the lump sum; the monthly experience is a service, not a contract term.
  • Recording: a recorded instrument securing only the settlement obligation at title transfer. Because there is no repayment floor and no sum certain, there is no debt to recharacterize — the security interest secures a genuinely contingent, symmetric equity settlement.

2. Why index settlement (the innovation)

Settling on the metro index rather than the specific house kills, by construction, the ugliest findings in the v1 file:

v1 finding killed How
Appraisal collusion at enrollment (red-team F3) No appraisal sets the settlement basis — the index does
Exit-value manipulation, related-party sales (F4) Sale price is irrelevant to the payoff formula
Renovation-receipt wars, estate receipt burden (F5/M9) Improvements never enter the formula — the homeowner keeps 100% of all house-specific value they create
Three-appraisal dispute machinery (§33) Nothing to dispute; the index is published by a third party
Market-pause AVM fights (ops 1.4) No pause exists; the Advance funded day one
Occupancy / maintenance covenant stack (§30) The investor's exposure is the metro, not the house: no occupancy covenant, no maintenance covenants, no rental prohibition, no loss-payee fights. Homeowner may rent the home, renovate it, or let the kitchen date itself — none of it is the investor's business

Consumer sentence that writes itself, and is true: "Everything you build is yours. We only share what your city's market does — up and down."

3. Homeowner proposition vs. alternatives

  • vs. HELOC: no payments ever; crash insurance a HELOC cannot offer at any price; no income qualification; cost is $0 in flat markets and negative in down markets. Honest flip side: in strong markets the index share costs more than HELOC interest — disclosed with the same scenario-dollar tables as the beta page.
  • vs. lump-sum HEI (Hometap/Point/Unison): symmetric (most HEIs share only upside or share value with floors); keeps all house-specific gains; formula buyout anytime without appraisal; upside cap protects long holds; no forced settlement term.
  • vs. v2 loan: no balance compounding against the homeowner; downside sharing; but a higher expected cost in boom markets — the two products are honest complements, not substitutes (certainty-seekers → v2 loan; diversifiers → v3).

4. Investor proposition

  • The asset: levered, collared exposure to owner-occupied metro HPI — the cleanest form of an exposure institutions cannot currently buy at scale. Expected return honestly framed: 6–9% with low correlation to credit and equities and positive inflation beta — a diversifier priced against allocators' alternatives in real assets, NOT a venture-return story. The premium over raw index growth comes from leverage (Share × V0 / Advance ≈ 3.5×), the liquidity/duration premium, and origination pricing.
  • Index settlement = modelable with published data (60+ years of HPI), no idiosyncratic-house risk, no servicing-intensive covenants, no fraud-adjacent valuation events.
  • Portfolio construction across metros = a housing-beta index fund built from primary origination at better-than-secondary pricing.

5. Deliberately retained protections (from the v1/v2 record)

All-owner/all-spouse execution; independent counseling; plain-dollar scenario tables (statutory HEI format, no home-brewed APR); no arbitration clause; TX excluded pending counsel; state HEI-statute footprint survey before launch; published pricing model (the transparency moat).

6. Open questions the panel must answer (the honest kill-risks)

  1. TAX (the crux): does a single lump-sum payment for a symmetric, index-settled share qualify for open-transaction / prepaid-forward treatment (Rev. Rul. 2003-7 analogy — single payment restored, genuine two-sided risk restored)? Or does INDEX settlement (cash-settled against a published index, not the property itself) recharacterize the contract as a notional principal contract / cash-settled derivative with periodic or ordinary income consequences — worse than v1? Where does §1234A / constructive-sale doctrine land? Homeowner-side treatment at settlement (basis, §121 interaction, character) under each branch?
  2. CEA / SWAP (potential structural kill): is a cash-settled contract referencing a home-price index a "swap" under CEA §1a(47)? Homeowners are not eligible contract participants — a retail swap is essentially prohibited off-exchange. Does recording against real property and tying settlement to a disposition of the home bring it inside the forward/real-estate exclusions? This question can kill v3 outright and must be answered first.
  3. SECURITIES: homeowner-side contract as a security (Howey — the homeowner receives cash, not an investment, but the index linkage invites analysis); fund-side compliance assumed and embraced; ICA status of a fund of index-settled recorded interests (§3(c)(5)(C) likely WORSE than v1 — these look more like derivatives than real-estate interests).
  4. BASIS RISK, consumer side: if the homeowner's house underperforms the metro (their block declines while the city rises), they owe index gains they didn't personally experience — bounded by the non-recourse proceeds cap, but real. Is the disclosure burden manageable, and does a min(index, actual-proceeds-based) settlement option reintroduce the appraisal machinery we killed?
  5. RECHARACTERIZATION residue: with no floor and true symmetry, does any credit/UDAAP theory still reach it (CFPB Roberts loss-sharing test should now be PASSED — confirm)? State HEI statutes (CT/MD/IL/ME) capture "shared appreciation agreements" — do they capture an index-settled symmetric contract too? (Likely yes — footprint question, not structure question.)
  6. ECONOMICS: is 6–9% honestly enough for the capital that must hold this (who is the buyer: pensions? sovereigns? real-asset allocators?), and is the homeowner pricing (Advance %, Share %, cap) simultaneously attractive against a HELOC in the scenarios homeowners actually experience? Where is the pricing identity now — did risk reallocation genuinely create surplus, or did we just move the zero-sum around?

END OF CONCEPT SHEET